Robot Likeability and Reciprocity in Human Robot Interaction: Using Ultimatum Game to determinate Reciprocal Likeable Robot Strategies by Sandoval EB et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Robot Likeability and Reciprocity in Human Robot
Interaction.
Using Ultimatum Game to determinate Reciprocal Likeable Robot Strategies
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Abstract Among of the factors that a↵ect likeabil-
ity, reciprocal response towards the other party is one
of the multiple variables involved in social interaction.
However, in HRI, likeability is constrained to robot be-
havior, since mass-produced robots will have identical
physical embodiment. A reciprocal robot response is de-
sirable in order to design robots as likeable agents for
humans. In this paper, we discuss how perceived like-
ability in robots is a crucial multi-factorial phenomenon
that has a strong influence on interactions based on re-
ciprocal robot decisions. Our general research question
is: What type of reciprocal robot behavior is perceived
as likeable for humans when the robot’s decisions a↵ect
them?We designed a between/within 2x2x2 experiment
in which the participant plays our novel Alternated Re-
peated Ultimatum Game (ARUG) for 20 rounds. The
robot used in the experiment is an NAO robot using
four di↵erent reciprocal strategies. Our results suggest
that participants tend to reciprocate more towards the
robot who starts the game and using the pure reciprocal
strategy compared with other strategies. These results
confirm that the Norm of the Reciprocity applies in HRI
when participants play ARUG with social robots. How-
ever, the human reciprocal response also depends on the
profits gained in the game and who starts the interac-
tion. Similarly, the likeability score is a↵ected by robot
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strategies (reciprocal and generous). However, there are
some discrepancies in the likeability score between the
reciprocal robot and the generous robot behavior.
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1 Introduction
Likeability is associated with friendly, cooperative and
pro-social behaviours [2] such as extroversion, agree-
ableness, and lack of over-conscientiousness [3],[4]. More-
over, likeability is a very complex phenomenon involv-
ing behaviours, manners, perceived intelligence, simi-
lar socio-cultural context, interests, and even physical
attractiveness, acceptability and popularity. In other
words, a person is considered likeable when he or she is
emotionally well-adjusted and she or he can be engaged
in high-quality relationships.
Future acceptance and of social robots will be asso-
ciated with their likeability. The measurement of like-
ability in robots is mostly associated with their degree
of anthropomorphism [5] and the design of the embod-
iment. However, the likeability of state-of-art robots
cannot be based on unique physical features. Robots
of the same model will be mass produced; therefore,
they will have identical physical embodiment. Sooner
rather than later, they may lose their novelty e↵ect
and their appearance might become ordinary. Hence,
the likeability of the robots will be determined mostly
by their behaviours towards humans.
We propose that people will find robots likeable de-
pending on three main conditions, each of which are
independent of their external characteristics: A) How
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successfully can the robot perform tasks that users ex-
pect? B) How does the robot behaviour match the in-
terest and personality of the users? For instance, does
the robot present slightly unexpected behaviour to keep
the attention of a curious user, and more predictable be-
haviour for users who prefer routine? C) How does the
human-robot interaction emotionally benefit the user?
This third point leads us to ask if humans would drive
the robot’s behaviours based on their own self-interest
or show reciprocal behaviour towards the robots if they
received benefits from doing so.
Several studies have been performed on the accep-
tance and likeability of the robots. However, most of
theses studies focus on the human-robot interaction
in controlled conditions. Not considering the material
benefits to the human and the reciprocally beneficial
human-robot interaction which is an important factor
for the likeability of the robots. Furthermore, some of
the research measuring likeability in HRI has been per-
formed using images, videos of robots or static robots
[7] instead of interactions with real robots [8] [9] [10].
On the other hand, very recently, some studies re-
vealed that humans tend to be reciprocal towards robots
and computers when playing Decision Games and when
asking for help [11] [12] [13] [14]. Furthermore, humans
try to reciprocate to robots even when this breaks the
social rules as our study in [15] describes. These facts
will be considered as possibly contributors to the like-
ability of the robots. In our previous work users found
the anti-social behaviour of a robot briber likeable [11].
Hence, we aim to investigate how di↵erent robot be-
haviours, particularly reciprocal behaviours, could have
an e↵ect in the robot-likeability.
We consider that reciprocity will determine how mean-
ingful the interactions between humans and the agents
will be. Although we cannot claim that robots and hu-
mans will develop relationships as deep as friendship or
love; we consider that in the future robots with a more
engaging, interesting and likeable behaviour will have
a greater chance of being accepted and popular among
users despite their lack of physical attractiveness [16]
[17].
In this paper, our goal is to describe quantitatively
the relationships between robot-likeability defined in
the Godspeed questionnaire [18] and the reciprocal in-
teractions between NAO robots and humans playing
20 rounds of Alternated Repeated Ultimatum Game
(ARUG). Furthermore, we investigate two factors: robot’s
reciprocal decisions (RRD) and robot’s reciprocal o↵er
(RRO) over the course of the interaction. We measure
their impact in measurements such as: participant’s re-
ciprocal decisions (PRD), participant’s reciprocal o↵er
(PRO), and participant’s profit (PP ). We also measure
the correlation between four di↵erent reciprocal strate-
gies (RRDxRRO)used by the robot playing ARUG and
the likeability scores and preference ranking.
2 Literature Review
Likeability is an important topic in HHI and HRI be-
cause humans tend to establish their relationships based
on how much they like (or dislike) certain kinds of peo-
ple. The use of the term ”likeable” is broad. Our short
definition is: easy to like and having pleasant or ap-
pealing qualities [6]. Extensive research has been done
on likeability in Human-Human Interaction. Some of
this can be analogous to robot-likeability research in
that people try to find the way to be likeable when
they are apart of a new group or in a new environment.
For instance, likeability in adolescents [3,4] and social
groups living in unfamiliar environments have been in-
vestigated [19]. In other cases, when a person starts a
friendship or a romantic relationship they tend to do it
based on likeability criteria. Over time, physical attrac-
tiveness and other factors tend to become less impor-
tant in the building of a relationship, and focus more on
the emotional and material benefits mutually obtained.
However, likeability can be a contradictory phenomenon.
Apparently people can find likeable some behaviours
that are not necessarily reciprocal, cooperative and mu-
tually beneficial. The nicest behaviour of a person is
not necessarily the most likeable for others; sometimes
it is perceived as boring. Conversely, in certain cases, a
subject can be aggressive, arrogant and manipulative,
but despite that, people might still find them likeable
[2]. Public figures such as rock-stars, athletes and politi-
cians sometimes show rude or even disgusting behaviour
but are still fascinating to the public.
It has been suggested that our reciprocal relation-
ships with robots are almost as complex as our rela-
tionships with other humans.The question we raise in
the domain of HRI is: Can human likeability be trans-
lated to a Human-Robot Interaction? In other words:
Should robots show likeable/unlikeable reciprocal be-
haviour in order to be liked? Our previous studies have
shown that robots showing unexpected behaviours or
even unacceptable behaviours received higher scores in
likeability as we discuss in [15] and [11].
2.1 Likeability and reciprocity
Fehr and Gachter discuss reciprocity in terms of posi-
tive and negative reciprocity [20] [21] [22]. They claim
that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently
much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted
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by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to
hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and
even brutal. Likeability and Reciprocity are strongly
connected; if we consider somebody friendly and pleas-
ant it is because generally we receive a reciprocal treat-
ment from this person or agent.
Although Kahn et. al. proposed reciprocity as a
benchmark in the evaluation of future Human-Robot
Interaction [1], reciprocal behaviour in Human-Robot
interaction has not been su ciently explored. Robot
designers have tried to implement highly cooperative
behaviours in robots but this is not necessarily the best
solution for encouraging social interaction between hu-
mans and robots. In this paper, we suggest that recip-
rocal behaviours (no necessarily cooperative behaviour)
in robots can o↵er another approach in terms of an ef-
fective, useful and engaging social interaction.
In order to measure reciprocal behaviours related
with likeability in HRI, we use the insights of Game
Theory. In Game Theory it is possible to take quan-
titative measurements of profit obtained, number of
cooperations and number of reciprocations in order to
correlate them with certain human characteristics into
simplified social scenarios called decision games. Sev-
eral studies have been done using decision games (Ul-
timatum Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Rock, Paper
Scissors Game) as experimental setup in HRI [11] [27]
[28] [29].
2.2 Alternated Repeated Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game has o↵ered a valuable instrument
to measure di↵erent psychological and economic mea-
sures. For instance, Burnell et. al., have researched the
optimal strategies without fairness when the Repeated
Ultimatum Game is played [23] and Oosterbeek found
common behavioural patterns regardless of cultural dif-
ferences in a meta analysis into the Repeated Ultima-
tum Game [24]. Besides, individual di↵erences related
with reputation [25], attractiveness [26], and the strate-
gies displayed during the Ultimatum Game (UG) have
been studied in depth in the economics field. These con-
cepts are strongly linked with the concept of likeability
that we use in this study (face-to-face setup). In our
case, likeability is more related to the robot behaviour
and its reputation during the game rather than its phys-
ical appearance, anthropomorphism or embodiment.
Similarly, Repeated Ultimatum Game is a well-known
game used very often in Behavioural Economics exper-
imental research [22]. In the original version, a pro-
poser decides how to distribute a certain amount of
money and the recipient can decide whether or not to
accept the distribution. If accepted both players keep
the money and conversely if the recipient rejects the
o↵er both players lose the money. For this study we
propose a novel configuration of the Ultimatum Game
called Alternated Repeated Ultimatum Game (ARUG).
In this version the mechanics of the game are the same
as in the original version. However, in our version the
players alternate roles every round. For instance, player
1 is proposer in round 1 and recipient in round 2 and so
on. This is done in order to measure the inter-dependencies
in terms of cooperation and reciprocation created for
the reciprocal responses and o↵ers of our robots. In this
study we had nine predetermined money distributions
programmed into the robot for each role it played.
3 Research questions
The aim of the experiment is to analyse the responses
in terms of the robot’s likeability (RL), participant’s
reciprocal decision (PRD), participant’s reciprocal of-
fer (PRO), and participant’s profit (PP ). We further
describe these measurements in section 4.6. The ARUG
involved two factors : robot’s reciprocal decisions (RRD)
and robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO). Additionally , there
is a between-condition called group (G) that describes
if the participant or the robot starts the game (ARUG).
In order to evaluate our aim we propose four research
questions:
1. Is Robot Likeability (RL) significantly a↵ected by
the robot’s reciprocal decisions (RRD), robot’s re-
ciprocal o↵er(RRO) and the starter of the interac-
tion (G) individually or interactively?
2. Is the participant’s reciprocal decision (PRD) sig-
nificantly a↵ected by the RRD, RRO and G indi-
vidually or interactively?
3. Is participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO) significantly
a↵ected by robot’s reciprocal decision RRD, robot’s
reciprocal o↵er RRO and group G individually or
interactively?
4. Is participant profit (PP ) significantly a↵ected by
the RRD, RRO and G individually or interactively?
5. What is the correlation between robot likeabilityRL
and participant’s reciprocal decision PRD, partici-
pant’s reciprocal o↵er PRO, and participant’s profit
PP?
6. Do participants rank the robots di↵erently depend-
ing on the robot’s factors and is this di↵erence sig-
nificant?
4 Method
We use 20 rounds of ARUG as a decision game able
to conduct a mix between/within 2x2x2 factors experi-
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ment. In which the between factor is G, in other words,
the starter of the session is human or robot. The within
factors (2x2) are robot’s reciprocal decisions (RRD)
and robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO) . RRD has two
conditions: Tit for Tat’s decision (TfT ) and Inverse
Tit for Tat’s (I   TfT ). Similarly, RRO has two con-
ditions: Reciprocal O↵er (RO) and Inverse Reciprocal
O↵er (I  RO).
TfT means that the robot follows the decision of
the participant. For instance, if the participant accepted
the robot’s o↵er in round X, the robot will accept the
participant’s o↵er in round X+1. Conversely, I   TfT
consist of rejecting the o↵er in the current round if the
participant accepted the o↵er in the previous round.
In RRO factor, RO condition means that the robot
matches the participant’s o↵er in terms of distribution.
The robot and participant have 9 predetermined op-
tions to distribute the dollars between them . The op-
tions are: Human 10 dollars:Robot 90 dollars, Human
20 dollars:Robot 80 dollars,...,Human 90 dollars:Robot
10 dollars. An additional condition exist when the robot
starts the game. In this case the robot initiates his game
with an o↵er of Human 50 dollars: Robot 50 dollars.
For example, in RO if the participant o↵ers a distri-
bution such as: Human 10 dollars: Robot 90 dollars,
the robot o↵ers the same reciprocal distribution in the
next round; i.e. Human 90 dollars: Robot 10 dollars. In
I RO the robot o↵ers a non-reciprocal distribution. To
illustrate, if the participant o↵ers a distribution such as:
Human 10 dollars: Robot 90 dollars, then the robot will
o↵er an inverse distribution such as Human 10 dollars:
Robot 90 dollars in the next round. See figure 1.
Fig. 1 The figure illustrates the di↵erences between RO and
I RO in two consecutive rounds. In I RO if the participant
is selfish, the robot reciprocates generously and vice-versa.
These factors are aimed to be perceived by the par-
ticipants as the individual strategies of four di↵erent
robots (A, B, C, D) in the experimental conditions. We
named the robots in this way in order to make them eas-
ier to remember for the participants. The strategies de-
ployed by the four robots were the result of four unique
Table 1 The four factor used in the experiment. Reciprocal
O↵er (RO), Inverse Reciprocal O↵er (I-RO), Tit for Tat (Tf),
Inverse Tit for Tat (I-TfT).
Robot/Human Starting Robot’s Rec. Decision (RRD)
Robot’s Rec. O↵er (RRO)
TfT I-TfT
RO Robot A Robot B
I-RO Robot C Robot D
combinations of the robot’s reciprocal decision (RRD)
and robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO) conditions; TfT x
RO is Robot A, I   TfT x RO is Robot B. TfT x
I   RO is Robot C and I   TfT x I   RO is Robot
D. See Table 1. A video demonstrating how the ARUG
was played during this study can be found at this URL
video.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We rotated the order of the robots using the Latin
square method, with interaction between the partici-
pant and the robot consisting of both visual and audio
communication. All four robots showed the same min-
imal level of verbal interaction and animosity to min-
imise the emotional impact on the perceived likeability
of each robot. O↵ers where made both verbally and vi-
sually by the robot, first stating its o↵er and secondly
point to the card containing its o↵er. The robot re-
ceived the participants responses to its o↵ers verbally
using speech recognition. The participants presented
their o↵ers visually by showing the robot a card con-
taining their o↵er. Apart from verbally relaying their
o↵ers/responses and general guidance, robots also ver-
bally rephrased participant’s actions. For instance, after
a participant o↵ered Human 70 dollars : Robot 30 dol-
lars, the robot would say ”You o↵er me 30. Ok, I accept
it”.
Fig. 2 Setup of the Experiment. The participant can choose
from nine di↵erent options and the robot can point out the
options.
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4.2 Materials
We used one NAO robot programmed in Choreographe
and Python, presented under the disguise of four dif-
ferent robots to participants. Experiment layout had
an ”Accepted” area and a ”Rejected” area for the of-
fers to be put into accordingly. A fixed layout of cards
with o↵er rates was placed before the robot, to which
it pointed with its finger to indicate its o↵er. Twenty
units of cards for each o↵er rate were placed in a similar
fashion in front of the participants, and were used for
making o↵ers to the robots and also for tracking the
accepted/rejected amounts. A laptop was placed on a
nearby desk for the online questionnaire. See Figure 2.
4.3 Process in Human Starting Condition
In both conditions, we performed individual sessions
of four ARUG games. Participants were welcomed and
led into the experiment room to receive a brief descrip-
tion of the experiment. After reviewing and signing
a consent form, they were asked to fill out an online
questionnaire that gathered demographic data includ-
ing their previous experience with robots. Then, par-
ticipants were then provided with an ID number and
shown a short video that demonstrated the experimen-
tal process. When they were ready, the robot was ac-
tivated through its feet bumpers, after which it asked
the for the ID number of the participant, who replied
verbally. After introducing the mechanics of the exper-
iment to participants, we started the experiment and
discretely observed the first 2 rounds from outside of
the room to make sure the participant was not experi-
encing technical issues, and then we left the room. After
each session we came back to change the robot and cal-
culate the results of the sessions to compare them with
data recorded in the robot and left again so that partic-
ipants would not feel pressured by having an observer.
Participants filled an online survey with the TIPI and
Godspeed questionnaire after each experiment and a
comment section regarding their opinions of the robot.
After each session, the experimenter came to count the
cards, re-stack them and pretend to replace the robot
with the next one. Once all four sessions were done, par-
ticipants filled out the ranking about how much they
liked each robot.Then any questions were briefly an-
swered. At the end of the experiment participants were
compensated by 0.03% of their accumulated symbolic
earnings which ranged between $6.00 and $13.00. This
experiment was approved by the Human Ethics Com-
mittee of the University of Canterbury [HEC APPLI-
CATION 2015/36/LR-PS]. See Figure 3 to see the sim-






















Fig. 3 Experimental proceduree.
A NAO robot was introduced as the participant’s
opponent in ARUG. The robot wore a tag that dis-
played ”A”,”B”,”C” or ”D” to emulate the perception
that the participant was facing four di↵erent robots
(whereas we used a single robot and reprogrammed it
between sessions). The robot asked for the ID number
to start the session in each condition. Once the session
started the robot requested the participant to take the
first turn, and asked the participant to show the card
that displayed the o↵er they wanted to give. By default
all four robots were programmed to accept the first o↵er
to prevent participants from identifying its action pat-
tern on the first round. Starting from the 2nd round the
robot started its programmed reciprocation patterns.
We designed it in this way to be consistent with the as-
sumption of the cooperative behaviour of social robots.
After each session the robot was taken out of the room,
and while the participant filled out the survey, was re-
programmed for the next reciprocation pattern and its
tag replaced accordingly, then represented to the par-
ticipant as their new opponent.
At the beginning of each round the robot announced
the number of the current round, and then if it was
the robot’s turn to o↵er it pointed to the proper card.
It then asked whether the participant accepted or not
and using the speech recognition system distinguished
whether the participant responded with a Yes or No. If
it was the participant’s turn to o↵er, the robot told the
participant to hold the card bearing the o↵er, and then
it gave its response based on its reciprocation pattern
using its vision system. At the end of the session of 20
rounds, the robot announced that the session was over.
The participant then was asked to fill out a survey on
their opinion on the robot and their perceived earnings.
After completing the final survey they were given the
amount of their earning on that session. See Fig. 4 to
see the experimental process per participant.
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“Round X, Please  
show me your card”
“Round X, l give you X. 
Do you accept? Please 
say Yes or No.”
“You give me X.”


















Fig. 4 Initialising the game depending if the human or the
robot starts.
4.4 Process in Robot Starting Condition
In robot starting condition, once the experiment started
the robot informed the participant that it would take
the first turn. It then proceeds to make a fair o↵er (Hu-
man 50 dollars: Robot 50 dollars) as default. This was
used in all four sessions to prevent the participants from
identifying its action pattern in the first round. From
the second round the robot began its programmed re-
ciprocation patterns.
4.5 Participants
We contacted participants via university boards, dedi-
cated websites, and Facebook groups in the city. After
disposing of the data from sessions which were not car-
ried out successfully due to human error or a robotic
malfunction, we had 38 participants in our experiment:
20 in the robot starting condition and 18 in the human
starting conditions. Half of the participants were male.
42% of the participants had prior experience in interact-
ing with robots in demonstrations and studies. 5% were
high school graduates, 42% were currently in college,
21% had college/university degrees, 13% were currently
in graduate or professional school, and 18% had grad-
uate or professional degrees. 68% of the participants
currently had jobs. 37% were from Oceania (Australia,
New Zealand and other countries), 29% were from Asia
(China, India, Japan and others), 18% were from Eu-
rope and 16% were from North and South America. The
average age was 25 years old (SD=6.99).
4.6 Measurements
The measurements in the experiment are: robot’s like-
ability (RL), which is an item of the Godspeed ques-
tionnaire series [18], participant’s reciprocal decision
(PRD), means that the participant follows the behaviour
of the robot in the immediate next round, participant’s
reciprocal o↵er (PRO), means that the participant matches
the o↵er of the robot in the immediate next round, and
participant’s profit (PP ) obtained by the participant
in each condition. Finally, participants did a general
ranking of their favorite robots.
5 Results
We performed a three-way mixed ANOVA (2x2x2) in
which the between factor is group G and the within fac-
tors are robots’s reciprocal decision (RRD) and robot’s
reciprocal o↵er (RRO). The measurements were robot’s
likeability (RL), participant’s reciprocal decision (PRD),
participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO), and participant’s
profit (PP ). See measurements, interaction e↵ects, main
e↵ects, means and standard deviations of each measure-
ment in Table 2, 3, 4 and 5.
The first research question; (Is Robot Likeability (RL)
significantly a↵ected by the robot’s reciprocal decisions
(RRD), robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO) and the starter
of the interaction (G) individually or interactively?) in-
vestigated the e↵ect of G, RRD, RRO on robot’s like-
ability (RL). There is a statistically significant three-
way interaction e↵ect between RRD, RRO, and G,
(F(1, 36) = 6.072, p=0.019). The outliers were kept
in the analysis. There was a significant two-way in-
teraction (F(1,19)= 4.452, p=0.048) between in RRD
and RRO appeared in the human condition but not in
the robot condition (F(1,17)=1.930, p=0.183). There
is a significant simple main e↵ect (F(1,19) = 4.902,
p=0.039) of RRD in the human starter group condi-
tion and a significant main e↵ect of RRD in the robot
group, (F(1,17)= 10.742, p=0.004). See Table 2 for in-
teraction e↵ects, means and standard deviations. The
robot C (TfTxI RO)received a high score in likeabil-
ity (4.12 out of 5) when the participant started the in-
teraction. In this interaction, the robot reciprocates low
o↵ers with high o↵ers. Robot C might be perceived as
a generous robot. The second highest likebility score is
granted to Robot A (TfTxRO) when the robot started
the interaction. Robot A has the second highest RL
score when reciprocal to the o↵ers of the participant,
RL= 4.01. Similarly, the results suggest that there is
a significant interaction e↵ect because the reciprocal
strategy of the robot (RRDxRRO) a↵ecting the like-
ability score and independence of the starter of the
game (robot or human). Also, the starter of the game
has a significant impact in the robots’ likeability score.
See 2.
The second research question (Is the participant’s
reciprocal decision (PRD) significantly a↵ected by the
RRD, RRO and G individually or interactively?) in-
vestigates the e↵ect of robot’s reciprocal decision (RRD),
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Table 2 Interaction e↵ects, main e↵ects, means and standard deviations of robot’s likeability (RL). Group (G), Robot’s
Reciprocal O↵er (RRO), Robot’s Reciprocal Decision (RRD), Tit for Tat (TfT ), Inverse Tit for Tat (I   TfT ), Reciprocal
O↵er (RO), Inverse Reciprocal O↵er (I  RO), Robot Likeability (RL)
Measurement Three-way interaction F(1, 36) = Human*TfT*RO Human*TfT*I-RO Human*I-TfT*RO Human*I-TfT*I-RO
RL G*RRD*RRO 6.072, p=0.019 3.66(0.85) 4.12 (0.81) 3.61(0.85) 3.51 (1.08)
Robot*TfT*RO Robo*TfT*I-RO Robot*I-TfT*RO Robot*I-TfT*I-RO
4.01(0.69) 3.97 (0.79) 3.16 (0.85) 3.49 (0.84)
RL Human starts Two-way interaction F(1,19)=
RRD*RRO 4.452, p=0.048
Main e↵ects F(1,19)=
RL Human starts RRD 4.902, p=0.039
F(1,17)=
RL Robot starts RRD 10.742, p=0.004
robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO) and group (G), on par-
ticipant’s reciprocal decision (PRD). A statistically sig-
nificant three-way interaction between RRD, RRO and
G that a↵ects PRD was found, (F(1, 36) = 12.665, p
= 0.001). There is a significant two-way interaction be-
tween RRD and RRO in the human condition, (F(1,19)
= 15.092, p=0.001). However, there is a non significant
two-way interaction between RRD and RRO (F(1,19)
= 1.294, p=0.271) in the robot condition. There is a
significant simple main e↵ect of RRD in the human
condition, (F(1,19) = 5.608, p=0.029). There is a sig-
nificant simple main e↵ect of RRO in the human con-
dition, (F(1,19) = 32.589, p <0.001). Besides, there is
a significant simple main e↵ect of RRD in the robot
condition, (F(1,17) = 11.018, p=0.004) and there is a
significant simple main e↵ect of RO in the robot con-
dition, (F(1,17) = 104.171, p <0.001). See Table 3 for
interaction e↵ects, main e↵ects, means and standard
deviations. Outliers were not removed from the data.
These results suggest that participants tend to recipro-
cate more towards Robot A when the robot started the
game with a fair o↵er. Participants reciprocate on av-
erage 9 times during the game. Robot A used a Tit for
Tat strategy and Reciprocal o↵ers (TfTxRO). Partic-
ipants reciprocate on average 8.2 times towards Robot
C (TfTxI   RO). Robot C was reciprocating low of-
fers with high o↵ers. Robot C has the highest likeability
score of the robots. See Table 3.
In the third research question (Is participant’s recip-
rocal o↵er (PRO) significantly a↵ected by robot’s recip-
rocal decision RRD, robot’s reciprocal o↵er RRO and
group G individually or interactively?), we investigate
whether RRD, RRO and G a↵ects participant’s recip-
rocal o↵er (PRO). We found that there is not an sig-
nificant three-way interaction e↵ect (F(1,36) = 0.824,
p=0.370). There is a statistically significant main e↵ect
of RRO, (F(1, 36) = 4.151, p= 0.049), a statistically
significant main e↵ect of the RDD, (F(1, 36) = 8.775,
p= 0.005) and a between subject main significant ef-
fect of G, (F(1, 36) = 8.137 p= 0.007). There are not
interaction e↵ect but we can observe that the partici-
pant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO) is independently aligned
with with the pure reciprocal o↵er RO of the robot,
the pure reciprocal robot’s strategy (TfT ), and the G
(robot/human starter). The highest number of partici-
pant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO) happened when the robot
started the interaction and the second highest num-
ber of participant’s reciprocal o↵ers happened when the
robot used RO o↵ers. See Table 4 for the means and
standard deviations.
The fourth research question (Is participant profit
(PP ) significantly a↵ected by the RRD, RRO and G
individually or interactively?), searchs0 for the strate-
gies that a↵ect participant’s profit (PP ).There is not
a statistically significant three-way interaction between
strategy, o↵er and group, (F(1, 36) = 0.053, p=0.819).
Outliers were not removed from the data. However,
there is a statistically significant two-way interaction
between RRD and RRO, (F(1, 36)= 34.006, p <0.001).
Statistically significant main e↵ects (F(1, 36) = 76.536
p<0.001) ofRRD were found. In addition,RRO present
a significant main e↵ect (F(1, 36) = 66.515, p <0.001).
We can observe that the combination of RRO and RRD
a↵ects participant’s profit. Robot C provides the high-
est profits to the participant (1219.21 hypothetical dol-
lars) being reciprocal and accepting low o↵ers paying
them high (TfTxI  RO). The second most profitable
interaction PP=752.63 happened with Robot A using
a pure reciprocal strategy of (TfTxRO). See Table 5
for the means and standard deviations.
In order to answer our fifth research question ( What
is the correlation between robot likeability RL and par-
ticipant’s reciprocal decision PRD, participant’s recip-
rocal o↵er PRO, and participant’s profit PP?), we de-
termine the Spearman’s correlation between the PRD,
PRO, PP and RL. Preliminary analysis showed the
relationships to be monotonic, as assessed by visual in-
spection of the scatter-plots. There was a positive mod-
erate correlation between PP and PRD, rho (152) =
0.513, p <0.0001 and a positive moderate correlation
between RL and PRD, rho (152) = 0.308, p <0.0001.
Similarly, there was a weak positive correlation between
RL and PP , rho (152) = 0.226, p <0.005 and a neg-
ative weak correlation between RL and PRO, rs(152)
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Table 3 Interaction e↵ects, main e↵ects, means and standard deviations of participant’s reciprocal decision
(PRD).Participant’s Reciprocal O↵er (PRD), Robot’s Reciprocal O↵er (RRO), Robot’s Reciprocal Decision (RRD), Tit
for Tat (TfT ), Inverse Tit for Tat (I   TfT ), Reciprocal O↵er (RO), Inverse Reciprocal O↵er (I   RO), Robot Likeability
(RL).
Measurement Three-way interaction F(1, 36) = Human*TfT*RO Human*TfT*I-RO Human*I-TfT*RO Human*I-TfT*I-RO
PRD 12.665, p=0.001 7.25(2.17) 8.2(2.04) 5.35(1.73) 3.0(1.65)
Robot*TfT*RO Robo*TfT*I-RO Robot*I-TfT*RO Robot*I-TfT*I-RO
9(0) 6.94(2.6) 2.89(2.14) 1.78(1.9)
Two-way Interaction e↵ects F(1, 19) = TfT*RO TfT*I-RO I-TfT*RO I-TfT*I-RO
PRD Human RRD*RRO 15.092, p=0.001 7.25(2.17) 8.20(2.04) 5.35(1.73) 3.0(1.65)
Main e↵ects F(1, 19) = RO I-RO
RRO 32.589, p<0.001 6.1(2.825) 5(3.36)
TfT I-TfT
RRD 5.608, p=0.029 7.8(2.1) 3.3(2.245)
Table 4 Interaction e↵ects, main e↵ects, means and standard deviations of participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO).
PRO Main e↵ects F(1, 36) = RO I-RO
RRO 4.151, p=0.049 2.7(2.49) 1.6(1.96)
TfT I-TfT
RRD 8.775, p=0 .005 2.4(2.733) 1.9(1.763)
Human Robot
G 8.137 p= 0.007 1.575(1.833) 2.79(2.6)
Table 5 Interaction e↵ects, main e↵ects, means and standard deviations of participant’s profit (PP).
Measurement Two-way Interaction e↵ects F(1, 36) = TfT*RO TfT*I-RO I-TfT*RO I-TfT*I-RO
PP RRD*RRO 34.006, p<0.001 752.63(251.93) 1219.21(387.05) 567.63(97.24) 707.89(122.48)
Main e↵ects F(1, 36) = RO I-RO
RRO 66.515 p<0.001 660.1(211.297) 963.6(384.106)
TfT I-TfT
RRD 76.536 p<0.001 985.9(400.46) 637.8(130.57)
Table 6 There are significant moderate and weak correla-
tions among robot’s likeability (RL), participant’s reciprocal
decision (PRD), participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO), and
participant’s profit (PP ).
p<0.02 PRD PRO PP
RL 0.308 -0.225 0.226
PRD 0.513
= -0.225, p <0.005. These correlations led us to spec-
ulate that robot’s likeability is a↵ected by the profits
obtained by the participants and participant’s recipro-
cal decisions. In other words, the robot is more likeable
when the interaction leads to higher profits and higher
number of participant’s reciprocal decisions but neg-
atively correlated with the participant’s reciprocal of-
fer. Participant’s reciprocal decision (PRD) and profit
are correlated when the participants figure out the re-
ciprocal patterns. However, these correlations are not
significant and it is not possible to draw generalised
conclusions from this analysis. See Table 6.
Finally, for the sixth question (Do participants rank
the robots di↵erently depending on the robot’s factors
and is this di↵erence significant?), in order to deter-
minate the favourite robots, we asked the participants
to rank them. We conducted a Chi square goodness-of-
fit test to determine whether participants ranked one
of the four robots significantly higher than the other
robots. The minimum expected frequencies were 9.5 for
the general ranking, 5 for the Human starter group and
4.5 for the Robot starter group. The robot A using TfT
x RO (pure reciprocal) was ranked highest followed
by robot C using TfT x IRO as reciprocal strategy.
All Chi square values for the four di↵erent robots are
not significant. However, these rankings could suggest
that the norm of reciprocity is accomplished for recip-
rocal robots and generous robots under this experimen-
tal setup. More studies are required to generalise these
conclusions. See table 7.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The robot’s likeability (RL) is a↵ected by the three-
way interaction e↵ect consisting of who starts the in-
teraction (G), robot’s reciprocal decision (RRD), and
robot’s reciprocal o↵er (RRO). Hence, a two-way ANOVA
was performed by separated groups. A two-way inter-
action e↵ect between RRO and RRD was found. The
robots displaying a reciprocal decision TfT were rated
higher in likeability than the robots using a inverse re-
ciprocal o↵er I   TFT . Indeed, the robot in the TfT
and I RO condition had a higher likeability score than
the other robots in the human condition. In this case
I  RO is beneficial for the robot in the TfT condition
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Table 7 Ranking of robot reciprocal conditions
TfT x RO and I   TfT x RO received the best rankings
due to probably the consistent reciprocal strategy and the
economic reward received by the participant respectively.
General Ranking of the robots
Favourite 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
TfT x RO 13 13 7 5
TfT x I  RO 9 9 9 11
I   TfT x RO 8 9 11 10
I   TfT x I  RO 8 7 11 12
Human Starter of ARUG
TfT x RO 5 8 3 4
TfT x I  RO 5 5 6 4
I   TfT x RO 5 5 5 5
I   TfT x I  RO 5 2 6 7
Robot Starter of ARUG
TfT x RO 8 5 4 1
TfT x I  RO 4 4 3 7
I   TfT x RO 3 5 5 5
I   TfT x I  RO 3 4 6 5
(Robot C) but not for the robot A in TfT and RO con-
dition (pure reciprocal). In the case of the robot starter
condition, there is a main e↵ect of RRD such that TFT
(M=3.98, SD=0.73) lead to higher scores of likeability
than I TfT (M=3.32, SD=0.85). In the robot starter
group the robot in the TfT and I   RO (Robot C)
condition also had higher scores. The likeability of the
robot due to the TfT and I   RO could be explained
by the unexpected behaviour of the robots towards the
participants and the nature of I TfT that reciprocate
low o↵ers with higher o↵ers as is explained in the next
paragraph.
The study performed in [15] shows similar results in
terms of the likeability of robots performing unexpected
behaviours even when these behaviours were breaking
social rules. Moreover, these results slightly match with
the results of the ranking of the robots after all the ex-
perimental sessions. The favourite robots in the ranking
were firstly the robot in TfT and RO (pure reciprocal)
condition and then TfT and I   RO condition. Prob-
ably the robot in TfT and I   RO was perceived as a
generous robot and that is why people liked it. They
didn’t expect that o↵ering low pays being rewarded
with higher pays from the robot during the ARUG.
Participants liked the unexpected financial benefit and
”nice” behaviour of the robot. On the other hand the
pure reciprocal could be perceived as easier to under-
stand. This knowledge can be useful for the design of
future robot behaviours, o↵ering unexpected robot be-
haviours and benefits to the users (low or high rewards)
in order to keep to the user engaged with the interac-
tion.
In terms of participant’s reciprocal decision (PRD),
a significant three-way interaction e↵ect existed. Then,
a two-way ANOVA was performed for each group. A
two-way interaction e↵ect between RRO and RRD was
found. Participants reciprocated more towards the robots
in the TfT condition than in the I TfT in the human
group. See Table 3 for means and standard deviations.
Participants reciprocated more towards the robot in the
TfT and I   RO condition in the same group. These
results are in line with our results in previous stud-
ies [15] in terms that the Norm of Reciprocity [30] ap-
plies in HRI. People tend to reciprocate towards robots
that show evident reciprocal behaviours. Furthermore,
they naturally reciprocate more towards the robot in
TfT and I  RO because it o↵ers higher financial ben-
efits: the robot made higher o↵ers when the partici-
pant o↵ered little money. No cases of humans o↵ering
high amounts of money to receive little money from the
robot appeared during the experiment. In the case of
the robot starter group, RD had a main e↵ect in the de-
cisions of the participants. They reciprocate more to the
robot in TfT condition, (M= 7.97, SD=2.09) than the
robot in I TfT (M=2.3, SD=2.07). Similarly, RO had
an impact in PRD in the robot group. Participants re-
ciprocate more frequently when the robot used a recip-
rocal o↵er in RO condition (M=5.94, SD=3.44), than
when the robot was using I  RO (M=4.36, SD=3.44).
Similarly to the human group, reciprocal strategies play
a role that lead us to think that the Norm of Reciprocity
rules the reciprocal behaviours in HRI. Moreover, the
use of simultaneous reciprocal di↵erent strategies has a
very defined outcome in terms of PRD and RL. In this
case, these interactive behaviour could be attributed to
the easy identification of a reciprocal pattern along the
20 rounds of the ARUG. These patterns are easy for the
participant to comprehend, allowing for easy prediction
and manipulation of future benefits in the game.
In terms of participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO) there
are no interaction e↵ects at all. There is a main ef-
fect of RO. Participants reciprocated the o↵er of the
robot more frequently in RO (M=2.7, SD=2.49) than
in I RO (M=1.6, SD=1.96). There is also a main e↵ect
of RD; participants reciprocate the robot’s o↵er more
often in the TfT condition (M=2.4, SD=2.733) than in
the I TfT , (M=1.9, p=1.763). We also found that the
initiator, makes a significant di↵erence in PRO. Partic-
ipants reciprocate the o↵er less (M=1.575, SD=1.833)
when they start the ARUG than when is the robot
who starts the game, (M=2.79, SD=2.6). Apparently,
the robot is capable of establishing a reciprocal pattern
when it starts the game that is easily followed by the
participant. These findings suggest that, ideally, robots
starting an interaction can establish the patterns of in-
teraction in an understandable way for the user.
There was not a three-way interaction e↵ect a↵ect-
ing participant’s profit (PP ),. However, there is a two-
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way interaction e↵ect between RRO and RRD that
can be explained with the main e↵ects. In RRO con-
dition participants had a higher profit with the robot
in the I  RO condition (M=963.6, SD=384.106) than
in the RO condition, (M=660.1, SD=211.297). Simi-
larly in RRD, participants had a higher profit with the
robot in TfT condition, (M=985.9, SD=400.46) than
with the robot in I   TfT , (M=637.8, SD=130.57).
In other words, the combination of TfT and I   RO
are the most profitable for the participant. The combi-
nation of the reciprocal movements and low reciprocal
o↵ers made the participant quickly notice that they can
obtain higher profit if they keep making negative recip-
rocal o↵ers (low o↵ers) because the robot will o↵er high
o↵ers in the next round. The main e↵ect of the RRO
made more profitable the strategies that imply more
RRD. For instance, a higher reciprocal o↵er coming
from the robot made it easier for the participant to ac-
cept it and do a reciprocal movement in the next round.
Hence, it is possible to claim that humans would prefer
to receive higher benefits from the robot compared to
what they o↵er it in other kinds of interaction. This is
comparable to what happens in Human-Human inter-
action when a person provides a service to another.
In terms of the correlations between robot’s like-
ability (RL), participant’s reciprocal decision (PRD),
participant’s reciprocal o↵er (PRO), and participant’s
profit (PP ), further studies are required due to the
moderate and weak nature of the correlations.
Finally, participants ranked the robots at the end of
the experiment. They had a general view of all the pos-
sible behaviours of the robots and freely decided their
favourite robot in their own terms as we can note in
their final comments. Although the chi square analy-
sis does not o↵er significant results, the ranking gives
some clue for future studies. People ranked TfT x RO
as their favourite reciprocal strategy and TfT x I RO
as their second favourite. In the case of TfT x RO, the
pure reciprocal robot, this could be explained due to the
fact that they could detect a reciprocal pattern easily
compared to the other robots which had more unex-
pected behaviour as we explained before . For Robot C
(TfT x I  RO), we observed a reciprocal pattern per-
ceived as generous due to the higher reciprocal o↵er of
the TfT x I  RO strategy when the participant made
a low o↵er. This reciprocal strategy of Robot C gave
to the participants who noticed it early more money
compared to the other strategies.
6.1 Conclusions
This study suggests that humans accomplish the Norm
of Reciprocity proposed by Gouldner [30] in the do-
main of HRI in terms of robot’s likeability, participant’s
reciprocal decision, participant’s reciprocal o↵ers, and
participant’s profits.We found that participants liked
the pure reciprocal robot strategy with TFT x RO and
TfT x I   RO conditions and obtained more bene-
fits from the combination of these strategies. TfT and
I   RO robot was likeable due to the unexpected be-
haviour bringing economic benefits to the participant.
This study is in line with the results of previous
studies [11] and [15]. It is possible to say that the Norm
of Reciprocity rules the interaction of decision games in
HRI in terms of simultaneous use of reciprocal strate-
gies in ARUG which is a relatively complex interactive
scenario. When the human starts the interaction, par-
ticipants reciprocate towards the robot that shows ev-
ident reciprocal behaviours, specifically with the robot
in the TfT and I   RO condition due to the higher
economic benefits(the participant o↵ers little money to
the robot and the robot made higher o↵ers).
When the robot starts the interaction, participants
reciprocate the o↵er (PRO) and the decision, (PRD) in
the TfT and RO conditions; more often than when the
human starts the interaction due to the robot establish-
ing a pattern which is easy to follow. Furthermore, if
the robot starts the interaction with a 50%:50% o↵er, it
could be perceived as a fair o↵er. This perception could
be the cause of the significantly higher reciprocation
towards this robot. These findings could be useful in
the future for designing complex reciprocal behaviours
for di↵erent social applications such as health-care, ed-
ucation or entertainment. Di↵erent layers of reciprocal
behaviours could work together in order to keep the
attention of the user and provide benefits by di↵erent
means.
Besides, the participant’s profit (PP ) is a↵ected si-
multaneously by RRD, and RRO as main e↵ects. Con-
sequently participants obtain a higher profit with the
robot in the TfT and I  RO condition. Although this
high profit, our analysis of correlations in the fifth ques-
tion, shows a weak correlation between PP and RL.
Although the people received a higher profit from
the Robot C using TfT and I   RO strategy they
ranked Robot A; the pure reciprocal robot (TfT and
RO), higher when they compare all the robots. This is
likely because this robot o↵ered easily comprehensible
and predictable outputs during the ARUG. However, in
the experimental session participants found more like-
able the TfT and I   RO robot condition. In other
words, a likeable robot as Robot C would not neces-
sarily be the favourite robot when it is compared with
other robots in a ranking. However, robots showing in
some reciprocity; such as the Robot A (TfT x RO)
and (TfT x I   RO) would be more beneficial for the
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users than those that do not. Again looks like recipro-
cal robots are more likeable that generous robots when
they are compared with other robots showing less ob-
vious reciprocal behaviours.
These findings should be considered for the future
design of interactive behaviours in social robots. More
investigation is required to these findings to real inter-
active scenarios. However, We expect that in the near
future these interactive patterns based in games can be
useful in more complex human-robot interactions.
6.2 Limitations and Future Work
Considering the complexity of the reciprocal behaviors
this scenario presented, further studies are required in
order to determinate stronger correlations between like-
ability and reciprocity. Besides, future scenarios in the
real world will o↵er more challenging conditions for
robot designers, requiring them to create even more
complex robot behaviours. In addition, the measure-
ment and analysis of other items in the Godspeed scale
as well as other psychological measurements could be
added to the study and to similar experiments.
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